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This paper uses the February 2008 auction rate security (ARS) market freeze to examine the spillover 
effects of an exogenous funding liquidity shock on the underlying asset markets. Consistent with theory, I 
find that the stocks held by closed-end funds (CEFs) that borrow from the ARS market experience larger 
declines in market liquidity and lower returns than other stocks after the ARS market freeze. These effects 
are more pronounced when (i) these ARS-levered CEFs hold a larger fraction of shares outstanding, (ii) the 
borrowing level from the ARS market is higher, and (iii) the stocks are less liquid before the ARS market 
freeze. The spillover effects of the ARS market freeze are temporary and diminish during the next 12 
months. Further investigation shows that the spillover effects are indeed associated with the heavy selling 
behavior of the ARS-levered CEFs after experiencing the ARS market shock. Overall, this study provides 
evidence that a funding liquidity shock to financial institutions can cause a decline in both market liquidity 
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This paper uses the February 2008 auction rate security (ARS) market freeze to examine the spillover 
effects of an exogenous funding liquidity shock on the underlying asset markets. Consistent with 
theory, I find that the stocks held by closed-end funds (CEFs) that borrow from the ARS market 
experience larger declines in market liquidity and lower returns than other stocks after the ARS 
market freeze. These effects are more pronounced when (i) these ARS-levered CEFs hold a larger 
fraction of shares outstanding, (ii) the borrowing level from the ARS market is higher, and (iii) the 
stocks are less liquid before the ARS market freeze. The spillover effects of the ARS market freeze 
are temporary and diminish during the next 12 months. Further investigation shows that the spillover 
effects are indeed associated with the heavy selling behavior of the ARS-levered CEFs after 
experiencing the ARS market shock. Overall, this study provides evidence that a funding liquidity 
shock to financial institutions can cause a decline in both market liquidity and the prices of the 
underlying assets. 
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Leverage and Liquidity: 
Evidence from the Closed-End Fund Industry 
The interaction between financial institutions’ funding liquidity and the financial markets in which 
they operate has received much attention in economics and finance studies. Theory shows that 
funding liquidity shocks to financial institutions can be transmitted to the underlying asset markets 
through three microeconomic mechanisms: (i) rollover borrowing (Acharya and Viswanathan (2011)); 
(ii) margin funding (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)); and (iii) redemption (Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). As Brunnermeier (2009) summarizes, funding liquidity risk can 
take three forms: (i) rollover risk, or the risk that it will be more costly to roll over short-term 
borrowing, (ii) margin funding risk, or the risk that margins will change, and (iii) redemption risk, or 
the risk that bank depositors or investors of mutual funds and hedge funds withdraw capital. 
Consistent with theory, previous studies show empirical evidence of the spillover effects of margin 
funding and investors’ redemption on underlying asset markets (Coval and Stafford (2007), Aragon 
and Strahan (2012)). 
One important type of financing that has been less studied is short-term rollover borrowing. 
Many types of financial institutions, such as banks, broker–dealers, hedge funds, and closed-end 
funds (CEFs), have substantial short-term rollover borrowing on their balance sheets. The rollover 
borrowing can be in the form of commercial papers, repurchase agreements (repos), and auction rate 
securities (ARS) that have to be rolled over during periods ranging from overnight to a few months. 
Though rollover borrowing is prevalent in financial firms, there is little empirical evidence of its 
spillover effects on the underlying asset markets. To fill this gap, I use the CEF industry as a 
laboratory to examine the spillover effects on the assets held by institutions that experience an 
exogenous shock to their rollover financing. 
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Due to their unique organizational structure, CEFs are exposed mainly to rollover risk, rather 
than redemption and margin funding risks. Many CEFs experienced a negative shock to their rollover 
borrowing when a primary borrowing source, the ARS market, froze in early February 2008. Since 
forces such as liquidity withdrawals of large broker–dealers were responsible for the ARS market 
freeze (Han and Li (2009)), it can be used as an exogenous funding liquidity shock to the CEF 
industry. I refer to CEFs that borrow from the ARS market as ARS-levered CEFs. Using this 
experiment, I find systematic evidence of the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze on stocks 
held by ARS-levered CEFs. My evidence suggests that the ARS market freeze caused a decline in 
both market liquidity and the prices of the stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs. 
The CEF industry provides an ideal setting to examine the issues related to rollover 
borrowing for the following reasons. First, CEFs are frequent users of leverage. The average 
borrowing level of U.S. CEFs is about 25% of their total assets (Cherkes, Sagi, and Stanton (2009)). 
Unlike hedge funds, which are largely unregulated and therefore do not have to report leverage, CEF 
leverage data are available on their balance sheets. Second, CEFs typically need to roll over their 
short-term borrowing because many of them obtain financing from the ARS market. The interest 
rates of auction rate securities are reset through auctions every one or four weeks. Third, unlike open-
end mutual funds and hedge funds, CEFs are not subject to redemption or margin funding risks 
because they are closed to fund flows and generally do not trade on margin. This feature allows me to 
focus on rollover risk without the confounding effects of other types of funding liquidity risk. 
Lastly, CEFs experienced a negative shock to their funding liquidity when the ARS market 
froze in February 2008. The ARS market freeze caused CEF borrowing costs to increase substantially. 
The reason is that when an auction fails, a CEF’s borrowing rate is automatically reset to the 
predetermined maximum rate according to the security prospectus, which can be as high as 20% 
(Han and Li (2009)). The ARS market freeze forced ARS-levered CEFs to liquidate assets to redeem 
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the auction rate securities they had issued. According to the Investment Company Institute, more than 
half of the 668 CEFs in their report had auction rate securities outstanding at the end of the first 
quarter of 2008, with a total liquidation preference of about $64 billion.1 In 2008 U.S. domestic 
equity CEFs redeemed about 60% of their ARS borrowing. While the deleveraging of the CEF 
industry may not have affected the overall stock market, it can have had substantial effects on 
commonly held stocks when many CEFs that experienced the funding liquidity shock attempted to 
sell these positions simultaneously. 
Using data on all U.S. domestic equity CEFs, I examine the spillover effects of the ARS 
market freeze on stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs. I use a difference-in-differences approach to 
compare changes in market liquidity and returns of stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs (the treatment 
group) to stocks not held by these CEFs (the control group) during the four quarters of 2008. My 
main results show that stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs experience larger declines in market 
liquidity and lower stock returns after the ARS market freeze than stocks not held by ARS-levered 
CEFs. The magnitude of the spillover effect is increasing in (i) the fraction of shares outstanding held 
by ARS-levered CEFs, (ii) the borrowing ratio from the ARS market of ARS-levered CEFs, and (iii) 
the illiquidity of stocks before the ARS market freeze. These spillover effects are also economically 
significant. For instance, for a given stock, a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of 
shares outstanding held by ARS-levered CEFs induces a 4.5 percentage point drop in annualized 
stock returns. In counterfactual tests, I do not find similar results before the funding liquidity shock 
(i.e., during 2006 and 2007). 
An alternative explanation of the results mentioned above is that there is some unobserved 
new information about the fundamentals of stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs. To test this alternative 
hypothesis, I investigate whether the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze on stock returns are 
                                                        
1
  See http://www.ici.org/policy/markets/domestic/08_sec_amps_com. 
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transient or permanent. I find that the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze on stock returns are 
only concentrated in the three-month period after the quarter-end holding date of ARS-levered CEFs 
and disappear over the next three quarters. Thus, the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze are 
temporary and unlikely to be driven by the arrival of new information. 
To confirm that the above results are indeed due to the ARS market freeze, I also consider the 
concurrent forces during the sample period, particularly investor redemptions of open-end mutual 
funds. Evidence shows that large investor redemptions from open-end mutual funds can induce price 
pressure on the stocks they hold (Coval and Stafford (2007)). To see whether such forces can explain 
the previous results, I include a mutual fund outflow measure following Edmans, Goldstein, and 
Jiang (2012) in my empirical tests. The main results are robust to the consideration of concurrent 
outflows of open-end mutual funds. 
To shed light on the channel for these spillover effects, I analyze the selling behavior of ARS-
levered CEFs after the ARS market freeze. I find that ARS-levered CEFs sell about 8.1% of their 
portfolio value each quarter after experiencing the ARS market shock, while other CEFs do not 
exhibit similar selling patterns during this period. Moreover, I find that the spillover effects of the 
ARS market freeze documented above are concentrated in the stocks sold by the ARS-levered CEFs. 
These results corroborate that the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze are driven by the selling 
behavior of ARS-levered CEFs. 
In addition, I examine how ARS-levered CEFs adjust their portfolios after experiencing the 
ARS market shock. I find that after the ARS market freeze, ARS-levered CEFs tend to sell positions 
that are liquid and have large market capitalization and lower liquidity beta. This evidence suggests 
that ARS-levered CEFs attempt to minimize the price impact by trying to avoid selling illiquid and 
small stocks in their portfolios. Taken together with my earlier findings, this strategic behavior does 
5 
 
not fully remove the negative impact of the ARS market freeze on ARS-levered CEFs, which borrow 
heavily from the ARS market and have concentrated portfolio holdings. 
To alleviate the concern that stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs and non-ARS-levered CEFs 
may have different characteristics, I use propensity score matching to construct an alternative control 
group. I find similar results of the spillover effects using this alternative control group. Moreover, my 
results are robust to the use of alternative ways of calculating liquidity changes (e.g., as percentage 
changes rather than absolute value changes) and the inclusion of international equity CEFs in my 
sample. 
This paper provides new empirical evidence that supports models that link the funding 
liquidity of financial institutions and the underlying assets they trade (e.g., Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009), Acharya and Viswanathan (2011)). Using an exogenous shock for identification, 
this study provides direct evidence that a decline in funding liquidity causes a drop in market 
liquidity and asset prices. This paper is closely related to Aragon and Strahan (2012), who show that 
the bankruptcy of a large broker (i.e., Lehman Brothers) can be transmitted to the underlying asset 
markets. This study adds the literature on the spillover effects of different types of funding liquidity 
shocks. Unlike open-end mutual funds and hedge funds, which mostly face redemption and/or 
margin fund risks, CEFs are exposed mainly to rollover risk. This paper is the first to study the 
spillover effects of a rollover borrowing shock on the underlying asset market. Moreover, while the 
explicit level of leverage used by hedge funds is not easily available due to the off-balance sheet 
activities and holdings of hedge funds are only available at the fund family level in 13F forms; this 
study uses the explicit level of leverage and the holdings of individual CEFs. This setting allows me 
to examine how the spillover effects vary with the level of leverage used by CEFs.  
This study also adds to the literature on the fire-sale externalities associated with leverage in 
the financial sector on financial markets (e.g., Stein (2009)). It is also related to empirical studies on 
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funding liquidity shocks and asset fire sales (Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2010), Boyson, 
Helwege, and Jindra (2010), He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010)), market liquidity during crisis 
periods (Anand, Irvine, Puckett, and Venkataraman (2010)), funding liquidity risk and stock returns 
(Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2011)), and funding liquidity and contagion (Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz 
(2010), Hau and Lai (2012), Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda(2012)). Using the ARS market freeze as an 
exogenous shock, this study allows one to establish a causal relation between funding liquidity and 
market liquidity. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the motivation for my 
empirical analyses. Section II describes the data and variables. Section III describes the empirical 
methodology. Section IV examines the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze on stocks held by 
ARS-levered CEFs. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
I. Motivation and Empirical Hypotheses 
A. Closed-End Funds and the Auction Rate Security Market Freeze 
Unlike open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds are frequent users of leverage. The average 
leverage ratio (defined as (Total assets - Total NAV)/Total assets)) of U.S. closed-end funds is about 
25% during the period 1994-2006 (Cherkes, Sagi, and Stanton (2009)). One primary form of their 
financing is the issuance of auction rate preferred stocks (ARPS) in the ARS market.2 Auction rate 
securities are long-term debt instruments whose interest rates are regularly reset through modified 
Dutch auctions every one or four weeks. The ARS-levered CEFs are exposed to rollover risk since 
they need to rollover their financing from the ARS market. 
                                                        
2
 Different from the usual auction rate securities with long-term debt maturity, auction rate preferred stocks (ARPS) 
have perpetual maturity and are typically redeemable. For more details on the ARS market, see Alderson, Brown, 
and Lummer (1987), and Alderson and Fraser (1993), Han and Li (2009), McConnell and Saretto (2010).   
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Another important feature of CEFs is that they are not subject to redemption risk and margin 
funding risk because they are closed to fund flows and usually do not trade on margin. This feature 
distinguishes CEFs from open-end mutual funds and hedge funds, which mainly face redemption risk 
and/or margin funding risks.3 It allows one to isolate the effects of rollover borrowing from the 
effects of redemptions and/or margin funding. In addition, CEFs have the simple business structure, 
which allows one to measure the explicit level of leverage using balance sheet data. In contrast, other 
leveraged institutions either have more complex organizational structures (e.g., multiple business 
divisions) as in commercial/investment banks or engage in many off-balance sheet activities as in 
hedge funds. These features make CEFs an ideal laboratory to test issues related to rollover 
borrowing. 
The main borrowing source of CEFs, the ARS market, froze in early February 2008.4 The 
freeze of the ARS market was mainly caused by liquidity withdrawals of large broker-dealers such as 
Citigroup, UBS, and Morgan Stanley (Han and Li (2009)), which is exogenous to the CEF industry. 
As a result of the ARS market freeze, ARS-levered CEFs’ borrowing costs increased substantially. 
The reason is that the ARS market borrowing rate automatically resets to the predetermined 
maximum rate according to the security prospectus (i.e., as high as 20%) when the auctions fail. The 
ARS market freeze thus forced CEFs to liquidate assets and redeem the ARPS that they had issued. 
According to a report by FitchRatings, over 70% of the 437 U.S. closed-end funds that they reviewed 
undertook redemptions of their ARPS in 2008, totaling $35.6 billion.5 As shown in Figure 1, U.S. 
                                                        
3
 Open-end mutual funds are are exposed mainly to redemption risk of fund outflow (e.g., Coval and Stafford (2007), 
Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010)) and generally less aggressive in using leverage to enhance returns (e.g., Koski 
and Pontiff (1999), Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004)). Moreover, hedge funds have some unique 
features, such as lock-up periods, notice periods, and redemption periods, to protect their investments (e.g., Aragon 
(2007), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009)), which can alleviate potential redemption risk.   
4
 On February 13, 2008, as much as 80% of auctions in the ARS market failed. See “Florida Schools, California 
Convert Auction rate Debt (Update5)” by Jeremy R. Cooke, Bloomberg.com, February 22, 2008, http://www. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awCJRyi5ngcQ&refer=us.   
5
 See “Closed-End Funds: Redemptions Provide Some Liquidity to Illiquid ARPS Market” by FitchRatings, August 
31, 2010, http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=552106.  
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domestic equity CEFs redeemed about 60% of their ARPS in 2008.6 For instance, the Claymore 
Dividend & Income Fund redeemed more than $300 million auction rate preferred shares in the 
second half of 2008, about half the size of their total assets under management.7 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
B. Motivation for Empirical Analyses 
Theoretical models predict that an adverse funding liquidity shock to financial firms (i.e., an 
event that makes it more costly or impossible to obtain funding) can be transmitted to the market of 
assets that these firms hold (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), 
Stein (2009), Acharya and Viswanathan (2011)). There are also many amplification models that 
propose that funding disruptions force financial institutions to engage in asset sales (e.g., Diamond 
and Rajan (2010), Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), Geanakoplos (2010), Krishnamurthy (2009)). As 
summarized by Brunnermeier (2009), different types of financial institutions expose themselves to 
three types of funding liquidity risk: (i) rollover risk (the risk that it will be more costly or impossible 
to roll over short-term borrowing); (ii) margin funding risk (the risk that margins and haircuts will 
change); (iii) redemption risk (the risk that depositors of banks or investors of mutual funds or hedge 
funds withdraw funds). 
Motivated by these theoretical studies, I empirically examine the spillover effects of a 
funding liquidity shock to financial institutions on underlying assets that they hold. The effects of 
reduced funding liquidity of financial institutions on the assets they trade/hold are not easily 
identifiable. To help identify any potential effects, I use the ARS market freeze in February 2008 as 
                                                        
6
 The level of borrowing from other sources of these CEFs also dropped, but to a much less extent, which suggests 
that many CEFs redeemed their ARPS by liquidating assets, not by raising capital from other sources such as bank 
loans. 
7
 “Leverage Shakes Up Mutual Funds, Which Discover a Strategy's Downside” by Shefali Anand, The Wall Street 
Journal, January 24, 2009. 
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an exogenous funding shock. While the $300 billion CEF industry may not have a large impact on 
the overall stock market, it could have substantial effects when a number of ARS-levered CEFs 
attempt to liquidate commonly-held positions simultaneously. For instance, domestic equity CEFs 
cumulatively owned between 1% and 15% of 245 stocks at the end of the last quarter of 2007. 
Specifically, I empirically test whether there is spillover effect of the ARS market freeze on the stocks 
held by ARS-levered CEFs. 
Moreover, I examine whether the spillover effects are larger when (i) leveraged CEFs hold a 
larger fraction of the stocks, (ii) CEFs have higher borrowing from ARS market, and (iii) the stock is 
already less liquid. Next, I investigate whether the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze on 
stock returns are temporary or not. To further confirm that the spillover effects are caused by the ARS 
market freeze, I also test whether any concurrent forces, in particular investor redemptions of open-
end mutual funds as in Coval and Stafford (2007), can explain the spillover effects. If the spillover 
effects are induced by the ARS market shock, one would expect the results to be robust to the 
consideration of concurrent forces such as investor outflows of open-end mutual funds. Lastly, I 
analyze the selling behavior of ARS-levered CEFs after experiencing the shock and test whether the 
spillover effects are indeed associated with the selling activities by ARS-levered CEFs. 
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, investment companies can only borrow up to 
33.3% of total assets or issue preferred stock up to 50% of total assets.8 Investment companies with 
leverage higher than the legal limits have three days to deleverage to stay in line with the federal 
requirements. These unconditionally constant legal limits can have potential perverse effects on asset 
markets when they force the investment companies to liquidate their assets to stay within the legal 
                                                        
8
 Closed-end funds can have both debt and auction rate preferred stocks on their balance sheets.  They are required 
to maintain $3 of assets for every $1 borrowed as debt, and $2 for every $1 issued as preferred stocks.  
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bounds. To this extent, my study can also shed light on the unintended consequences of imposing a 
constant leverage ratio on financial institutions such as investment companies. 9 
 
II. Data and Variables  
I first obtain information on all the U.S. closed-end funds that existed during the period from 
2006 to 2009 from CRSP. This information includes PERMNO, fund name, market capitalization, 
and stock returns.10 I then classify the closed-end funds based on the investment objectives published 
in their prospectus using the business descriptions of the funds.11 Closed-end funds are classified into 
the following main categories: domestic equity, municipal bond, taxable fixed income, international 
equity, and others. To have a clean setting of testing the spillover effects, I focus on domestic equity 
CEFs in my study as these funds primarily invest in the U.S. domestic equity market. I exclude from 
my sample CEFs that primarily invest in municipal bonds, taxable bonds, international equity, REITs, 
and preferred stocks.12 The final sample includes 103 domestic equity closed-end funds during the 
period from 2006 to 2009. My sample size is comparable to the ones used in previous literature (e.g., 
Bradley, Brav, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010)).  
A key data component to this study is the degree of leverage used by closed-end funds, which 
is calculated using the data from the balance sheets of these funds. The balance sheet data are 
available in Form N-SAR that CEFs must file with the SEC semi-annually. I retrieve the information 
                                                        
9
 In the second half of 2008, SEC implemented temporary relief measures available to certain CEFs, designed to 
afford greater flexibility in avoiding forced deleveraging. The temporary relief measures were only for CEFs with 
above 33% preferred stock leverage, which makes them impossible to refinancing with debt to redeem all their 
preferred stocks. Moreover, it is subject to SEC approval and applies only to debt issued during the next two years 
for the purposes of redeeming outstanding auction rate preferred stock.  
10
 Closed-end funds in CRSP are with the second digit of share code 4, mostly with share code 14 or 44. 
11
 I use the information on the CEF’s websites and SEC filings as well as business descriptions available on websites 
such as BusinessWeek (www.businessweek.com). I also verified my classifications with the information from 
Morningstar database.  
12
 There are 32 international equity CEFs that hold positions in U.S. equity market during the four quarters of 2008. 
My results are robust if I include these international equity CEFs in my sample. 
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from the N-SAR forms after downloading these forms from the SEC EDGAR database. Next, I 
manually match the balance sheet data to the closed-end fund data from CRSP by Ticker and fund 
names. I obtain the CEFs’ quarterly portfolio holdings from Thomson Reuters’ S12 Ownership 
Database. Lastly, I match the data from CRSP and the N-SAR forms to Thomson Reuters’ holdings 
data by fund name. 
As in Cherkes, Sagi, and Stanton (2009), the total leverage of a closed-end fund 
(Leverage_total) is calculated as the difference between total assets and total net asset value divided 
by total assets. The leverage from the ARS market (Leverage_ARS) is measured as the total value of 
auction rate preferred stocks divided by total assets. Since the balance sheet data are available only at 
semi-annual frequency, I create a quarterly series by assuming the leverage ratios in the non-
reporting quarters are the same as the previous quarters. 
                                                                               (1) 
                                                                                 (2) 
where i indexes closed-end funds; t indexes quarters. 
Table I Panel A presents the summary statistics of fund characteristics. The average total 
assets and market capitalization (share price times the shares outstanding) of the closed-end funds are 
$557.3 and $411.9 million, respectively. The mean (median) total leverage ratio of the closed-end 
funds in my sample is 19.7% (20.7%). Moreover, closed-end funds tend to borrow mainly through a 
single channel, either the ARS market or other sources such as bank loans.13 
[Insert Table I here] 
I refer to CEFs with non-zero borrowing from the ARS market as ARS-levered CEFs. Funds 
with no ARS borrowing are labeled as non-ARS-levered CEFs. In Panel B of Table I, I present the 
                                                        
13
 The correlation of the two types of leverage are negative (-0.25) and significant at 1% level.  
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fund characteristics for each group of funds in the year of 2008. The results suggest that ARS-levered 
funds have more total assets under management and more highly-concentrated portfolios than non-
ARS-levered CEFs. The average total leverage of ARS-levered CEFs is 34.9% of total assets; the 
total leverage of non-ARS-levered CEFs is 9.6% of total assets. Interestingly, the average leverage 
ratio from other sources is similar across the two groups of CEFs. This feature is important for my 
empirical test when I use non-ARS-levered CEFs to serve as the control group to ARS-levered CEFs. 
In my empirical tests, stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs are the treatment group. To construct 
a control group, I consider the stocks held by non-ARS-levered CEFs, but not held by ARS-levered 
CEFs. This control group tends to have similar characteristics to the treatment group. The stocks not 
held by any CEFs are not included in my sample. 14 
I use two variables to measure market illiquidity. The first measure is relative bid-ask spread, 
which is defined as the difference between ask and bid prices divided by the midpoint of the bid and 
ask prices. The second variable is Amihud’s (2002) measure, which is defined as the ratio of absolute 
value of daily return over daily dollar volume. 
                           
             
 
                                                 (3) 
                                                                                       (4) 
where i indexes stocks; and t indexes dates. Both the relative bid-ask spread and the Amihud measure 
capture illiquidity; that is, a higher level of Amihud or Rspread means that the stock is less liquid. 
Each daily measure is averaged across all the trading days within a quarter to obtain a quarterly 
measure. I use natural logarithmic transformations of these variables in my empirical tests to mitigate 
any concerns related to the skewness of these variables. 
                                                        
14
 Interestingly, the stocks that are not held by any CEFs are smaller and less liquid than the two groups considered 
in my tests (results untablulated). 
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For each stock, I aggregate the CEFs’ holdings at each quarter end. The unit of the holdings 
variable is the percentage of shares outstanding. I also aggregate the ownership of ARS-levered CEFs 
separately (Shrpct_CEF_ARS). Moreover, to examine whether the spillover effects vary with CEFs’ 
level of borrowing from ARS market, I also construct continuous variables of leverage of CEFs at the 
stock level. Specifically, for each stock, I calculate a weighted average level of total leverage and 
leverage from ARS market of CEFs that hold that stock in their portfolios as follows: 
                    
 
                                                        (5) 
                                   
 
   
  
where i indexes stocks; j indexes closed-end funds; and t indexes quarters. For instance, suppose two 
closed-end funds hold stock i at quarter t: the first one, with total leverage of 30%, owns 10,000 
shares and the other one, with total leverage of 15%, owns 5,000 shares. Based on equation (1), the 
average total leverage for stock i at quarter t is 25% (=30%*10K/15K +15%*5K/15K).15 Based on 
equation (1), I calculate two weighed average measures at stock level for total leverage and leverage 
from the ARS market, respectively. 
Table II Panel A presents the summary statistics of stocks held by any CEFs for the four 
quarters in 2008. It is worth noting that when calculating the average market liquidity measures and 
average daily returns for the first quarter of 2008, the trading days before the February 7, 2008 
auction-ration security market shock are excluded. The average changes in Log(Rspread) and 
Log(Amihud) over the previous quarter are positive, while the average daily stock return is negative. 
These findings suggest that, for an average stock in my sample, both its liquidity and its price 
dropped in 2008. In my empirical tests, I do not try to explain the overall drop in market liquidity and 
stock prices in 2008. Instead, I take a difference-in-differences approach to identify the spillover 
                                                        
15
 These average leverage variables do not take into account of the aggregate holding level of CEFs. 
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effects of the ARS market freeze on stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs.16 The average (median) total 
leverage of a stock is 11.4% (12.8%), while the average (median) leverage from the ARS market is 
4.7% (0.0%). The market beta and liquidity beta for a stock at a given month are obtained from a 
regression of monthly stock returns on the value-weighted CRSP stock returns and the liquidity 
innovation factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) in the previous five years. 17 
[Insert Table II here] 
As shown in Table II Panel A, the mean (median) ownership of all closed-end funds in term 
of percentage of shares outstanding is 0.29% (0.05%). The maximum ARS-levered CEF ownership 
for a stock in my sample is 14.6%. In Panel B of Table II, I also show the ownership distribution of 
CEFs at the end of the fourth quarter of 2007. The closed-end funds in my sample own positive 
quantities of more than 60% of all common stocks (share code 10 or 11) in the CRSP database. These 
funds own 1%-15% of 245 stocks (about 5% of all common stocks on CRSP), meaning they hold 
significant positions in a number of stocks. 
Figure 2 reports median quarterly percentage (%) changes in liquidity for the stocks held by 
ARS-levered CEFs after the ARS market freeze. I divide the sample of stocks held by ARS-levered 
CEFs into three groups based on the aggregated ownership: (0%, 1%], (1%, 3%], (3%, 15%). For 
both Rspread and Amihud, the percentage changes is calculated as (Illiquidity(t) - Illiquidity(t-1))/ 
Illiquidity(t-1). The figure provides preliminary evidence that the decrease in liquidity was more 
severe for stocks with higher ARS-levered CEF ownership. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 
                                                        
16
 See Section III for more details of the difference- in-differences approach in the empirical tests. 
17
 The liquidity innovation factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) is obtained from WRDS.  To get the market beta 
and liquidity beta, I require a stock to have at least 24 monthly observations to be included in the regressions.  
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III. Empirical Methodology 
The goal of my empirical design is to identify the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze 
on stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs. I first estimate the following panel regression model over the 
four quarters in 2008: 
                                                                                 
                                                                                                                
where i indexes stocks; j indexes industries (2-digit SIC code level) ; and t indexes quarters. 
                      is percentage of shares outstanding of stock i held by ARS-levered CEFs at 
the end of quarter t-1. The dependent variables are changes in quarterly stock liquidity (the log of 
relative spread or the log of Amihud ratio) or the quarterly average of daily stock returns. The main 
purpose of the regressions is to determine whether the spillover effects on market liquidity and stock 
returns are significantly different from zero; that is, the null hypothesis is    =0. I expect    to be 
positively significant for market liquidity and negatively significant for daily returns. 
In Equation (7), I further consider the level of borrowing by ARS-levered CEFs from the 
ARS market. Specifically, I interact ARS-levered CEF stock holdings with a stock-level leverage 
variable and include this interaction term in the regressions. The leverage variable (Leverage_ARS) is 
the weighted average of leverage from the ARS market of all CEFs that hold that stocks. While 
equation (6) allows me to test whether the spillover effects increase in the level of ownership by 
ARS-levered CEFs, this model allows me to test whether these spillover effects are intensified for 
stocks held by CEFs with higher ARS borrowing. 
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where i indexes stocks; j indexes industries (2-digit SIC code level) ; and t indexes quarters.  
              is a dummy that indicates that the ownership of ARS-levered CEFs is above the 
median level among all stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs.                     is the weighted 
average of leverage from the ARS market of CEFs that held stock i at the end of quarter t-1. The 
dependent variables used in the model are changes in quarterly market liquidity or quarterly average 
daily returns. I test whether there is an intensifying effect between the holdings and the level of 
borrowing from the ARS market by ARS-levered CEFs. If the spillover effects increase with the level 
of CEFs’ ARS market borrowing, I expect    to be positively significant for market liquidity and 
negatively significant for daily returns. 
The identification of models (6) and (7) rely on cross-sectional comparison of stocks held by 
ARS-levered CEFs (the treatment group) and those that were not held ARS-levered CEFs. In the 
control group, I only include stocks that are not held by ARS-levered CEFs but are held by non-ARS-
levered CEFs, since these stocks are likely similar to those stocks in the treatment group.18 It is 
important to note that my empirical tests do not aim to explain the overall drop in market liquidity 
and stock prices after February 2008. 
Rather, both equations (6) and (7) use a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the 
effects of the ARS market freeze on the treatment group. The first step is to compute the changes in 
stock liquidity before and after the ARS market shock for the stocks in treatment and control groups 
separately.19 The second step is to take the difference in the liquidity changes of these two groups. 
This will give us an estimate of the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze on the treatment group. 
In both models, I included quarter fixed effects as well as industry fixed effects (2-digit SIC 
level). The overall market liquidity changes over time will be absorbed by the time fixed effects, 
                                                        
18
 My results are robust if I use the propensity score matching method to construct the control group.  See Section 
IV.H for more details.  
19
 For the second, third, and fourth quarters in 2008, the differences are between the average market liquidity of 
current quarter and previous quarter.   
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while any industry level changes will be captured by the industry fixed effects. Moreover, I control 
for the lagged market liquidity (Lagged Liquidity Level), the aggregate ownership level of 
institutional investors at previous quarter-end (Shrpct_Other), market capitalization (Log(Size)), a 
dummy variable for stocks listed on NASDAQ (NASDAQ Dummy), market beta (Market Beta), and 
lagged idiosyncratic volatility (Idio. Volatility) in the regressions.20 I also include Liquidity Beta of 
the stock to control for liquidity risk (Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005)). Lastly, I adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and cluster them 
at the stock level with time fixed effects.21 
 
IV. Spillover Effects of the ARS Market Freeze 
A. Spillover Effects and Ownership of ARS-levered CEFs 
I first run pooled OLS regressions using model (6) with quarter and industry fixed effects. In 
this specification, the empirical question to be answered is whether there are spillover effects of the 
ARS market freeze on the stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs. The dependent variables are changes in 
the log of relative spread, changes in the log of Amihud ratio, and average daily stock returns. 
Results are reported Table III. 
[Insert Table III here] 
The results in Table III suggest that the spillover affects increase with the ownership of ARS-
levered CEFs. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficients on the ownership of ARS-levered CEFs 
(Shrpct_CEF_ARS), namely   , are significantly positive: 3.39 with t-stat. of 4.78 for  Log(Rspread) 
and 5.07 with t-stat. of 4.34 for  Log(Amihud). In column (3), the coefficient on the ownership of 
                                                        
20
 For the aggregate ownership level of institutional investors, I exclude the ownership level of all the U.S. closed-
end funds.  
21
 This procedure accounts for potential cross-sectional correlations of the error terms across different firms and 
serial correlation of the error terms within the same firm over time (Petersen (2009)).  Moreover, my results are 
similar if I cluster the standard errors at the industry level such as 3-digit SIC code level. 
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ARS-levered CEFs is negative (-2.73) and significant (t-stat.= -4.07). These results suggest that 
higher ARS-levered CEFs’ ownership leads to larger declines in daily stock returns after the ARS 
market shock. 
As one would expect, stocks with smaller Log(Size), higher Market Beta, higher Liquidity 
Beta, and higher Idio. Volatility have larger drop in market liquidity and lower daily returns. 22 
Moreover, non-NASDAQ listed stocks experienced large market liquidity drop than NASDAQ listed 
stocks. The coefficients on the holdings of other institutional investors (Shrpct_Other) are 
insignificant across all the three columns, suggesting that the ownership of other institutional 
investors cannot predict future changes in market liquidity and stock returns. 
The spillover effects are also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in 
the ownership by ARS-levered CEFs induces a increase of 0.022 (=3.39* 0.64%) in the log of 
relative spread measure (the mean change is 0.16), a increase of 0.032(=5.07*0.64%) in the log of 
Amihud measure (the mean change is 0.36), and a decrease in daily stock return of 1.75 basis points 
(= -2.73*0.64%) (average daily return is -11 basis points). Overall, the results show stocks held by 
ARS-levered CEFs experienced larger drop in market liquidity and lower daily returns than stocks 
that were not held by these funds after the ARS market freeze. 
I also consider counterfactual tests for the main findings in Table III by looking at the period 
before the ARS market freeze (i.e., in the period of 2006 and 2007). Specifically, I estimate the same 
regressions of model (6) as in Table III, but for the period of 2006-2007. The results are reported in 
Table IV. When the changes in market liquidity variables are used as the dependent variable, the 
coefficients on the ownership of ARS-levered CEFs are positive, but insignificant at conventional 
levels. In column (3), with average daily returns as the dependent variable, the coefficient on 
                                                        
22
 The coefficients on Lagged Liquidity Level have the opposite sign due to the high correlation with Log(Size) (over 
0.85). With Lagged Liquidity Level included alone, its coefficients are significantly positive in the first two columns 
and negative in column (3).    
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Shrpct_CEF_ARS is positive and insignificant (0.29 with t-stat. of 0.91). Thus, I do not find similar 
spillover effects in the period before the ARS market freeze, that is, during 2006 and 2007). These 
falsification tests further confirm that the results in Table III are due to the freeze the ARS market. 
[Insert Table IV here] 
 
B. Short-term vs. Long-term Effects of the ARS Market Freeze 
An alternative explanation of the results documented above is that there is some concurrent 
unobserved new information about the fundamentals of stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs. In this 
section, I test this alternative hypothesis by investigating whether or not the spillover effects of the 
ARS market freeze on stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs are temporary. If the above spillover effects 
are only short-term, they are likely not driven by unobserved new information. The reason is that the 
arrival of any new information will have a long-term effect on stock returns. 
To see how long the spillover effects persist, I examine the relation between the ownership of 
ARS-levered CEFs (Shrpct_CEF_ARS) at the previous quarter-end and future cumulative stock 
returns. Specifically, I estimate equation (6) with the cumulative stock returns over various horizons 
as the dependent variables. The regressors are the same as in Table III with time and industry fixed 
effects are included in the regressions. If the effects of the ARS market freeze are temporary, one 
would expect that the coefficients on ownership of ARS-levered CEFs to be negative and significant 
for cumulative stock returns over short horizons (i.e., 3-month horizon), but not significant for 
cumulative stock returns over longer horizons (i.e., 12-month horizon) 
The OLS estimation results are reported in Table V. The dependent variables in columns (1)-
(4) are cumulative stock returns over 3-month, 6-month, 9-month, and 12-month horizons 
respectively. Table V contains two interesting findings. First, in column (1), the coefficient on 
Shrpct_CEF_ARS is -1.48 (t-stat.=-5.19), significant at the 1% level. This result is similar to my 
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finding in column (3) of Table III, where average daily returns over a quarter are used as the 
dependant variable. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard deviation increase in 
Shrpct_CEF_ARS is associated with a 0.95 percentage point drop in the 3-month cumulative returns. 
[Insert Table V here] 
Second, the coefficient on Shrpct_CEF_ARS converges to zero and becomes statistically 
insignificant when longer horizon cumulative stock returns are used as the dependent variable. 
Specifically, the coefficients on Shrpct_CEF_ARS are -1.01 (t-stat.=-2.21) for 6-month cumulative 
stock returns in column (2), -0,78 (t-stat.=-1.14) for 9-month cumulative stock returns in column (3), 
and 0.02 (t-stat.=0.03) for 12-month cumulative stock returns in column (4). In sum, these results 
suggest the ARS market freeze in February 2008 only has a short-term effect (i.e., 3-month), rather 
than a permanent effect, on stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs. Thus, the ARS market freeze is a 
temporary funding liquidity shock to the ARS-levered CEFs. It does not change the fundamentals of 
the stocks held by the ARS-levered CEFs. 
To further check the time series change of spillover effects of the ARS market freeze, I 
estimate equation (6) with cumulative stock returns over 12 horizons starting from 1-month up to 12-
month as the dependent variables. Then, I plot coefficients on the ownership by ARS-levered CEs 
(Shrpct_CEF_ARS) from the estimations in Figure 3. As shown in Figure 3, the effect of the 
ownership by ARS-levered CEs on stock returns are only concentrated in the 3-month after the 
quarter-end holding date of ARS-levered CEFs. After that, the spillover effects disappear over the 
next three quarters. All the above results show that the effects of the ARS market freeze on stock 
returns are temporary in nature and are unlikely to be driven by the arrive of new information. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
C. Spillover Effects and Leverage from ARS Market by CEFs 
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To test whether the spillover effects intensify as the level of borrowing from the ARS market 
increases, I include an interaction term of ARS-levered-CEFs holdings and the level of ARS market 
borrowing by ARS-levered CEFs in my next set of tests. These models are described in Equation (7). 
Table VI reports the results. First, I find that the coefficients of the dummy variable 
(Hold>Median) are positive for the liquidity-related variables and negative for stock returns, 
consistent with my results in Table III. Second, the coefficients on the interaction term, 
Leverage_ARS×(Hold>Median), have the predicted sign in all three columns: 0.337 (t-stat. = 1.96) 
with  Log(Rspread), 0.371 (t-stat. =3.76) with  Log(Amihud), and -0.283 (t-stat. = -1.67) for daily 
returns. In terms of economic significance, for stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs at above median 
levels, a 10% increase in ARS-market leverage is associated with an increase of 0.03 (=0.337*10%) 
in Log(Rspread) (the mean change is 0.21), an increase of 0.04 (=0.371*10%) in Log(Amihud) (the 
mean change is 0.41), and a decrease in daily stock returns of 2.8 basis points (= -0.283*10%) 
(average daily return is -14 basis points). These results suggest that the spillover effects of the ARS 
market freeze intensify when the CEFs were more affected by the ARS market freeze. 
 [Insert Table VI here] 
 
D. Spillover Effects and the Pre-Shock Liquidity Level 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) predict that the “liquidity spiral” effects are more 
pronounced if the stock is ex ante less liquid. To empirically test this prediction, I interact the 
Shrpct_CEF_ARS variable in model (6) with two dummy variables capturing stock liquidity before 
the ARS market freeze. Specifically, the sample of stocks is split into two subsamples based on the 
median liquidity level in 2007 of stocks in the CRSP database. The modified specifications allow me 
to estimate spillover effects separately for the two subsamples. Based on the theoretical model by 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), I expect that the spillover effects will be stronger for the 
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subsample of stocks that were relatively illiquid before the ARS market freeze. Thus, I expect the 
difference of the two interactions to be positive. 
Table VII presents the results for the modified model (6). The results are consistent with the 
prediction of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). For both market liquidity measures, coefficients on 
Shrpct_CEF_ARS × Illiquid Dummy and Shrpct_CEF_ARS × Liquid Dummy are both positive and 
significant. More importantly, the former is significantly larger than the latter (with a difference of 
2.59 for  Log(Rspread), p-value of 2.34%, and 3.56 for  Log(Amihud), p-value of 5.47%). My 
finding is similar to what Aragon and Strahan (2012) find using a different exogenous event, the 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy to examine margin funding risk in hedge funds. Moreover, the results 
are robust when I run the regressions separately on the two subsamples, rather than using the 
interaction term (untablulated). In sum, the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze are stronger if 
the stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs are less liquid before the ARS market freeze. This evidence 
supports the theory of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
[Insert Table VII here] 
 
E. Spillover Effects of the ARS Market Freeze and Concurrent Forces 
 To confirm that the above spillover effects are caused by the ARS market freeze, one needs 
to consider the concurrent forces during that time period, such as inflows and outflows of open-end 
mutual funds (e.g., Coval and Stafford (2007)). Many open-end mutual funds experienced large 
outflows in the year of 2008, which can induce price pressure on the stocks if they need to sell the 
stocks to meet the redemption. To test whether my results are driven by concurrent outflows of open-
end mutual funds, I construct a mutual fund outflow measure (MF_Outflow) at the stock level. 
Following Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), I construct this measure using funds’ previously 
disclosed portfolio holdings, rather than mutual funds’ actual purchases and sales (as in Coval and 
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Stafford (2007)). I first calculate the percentage flow of each open-end mutual fund in Thomson 
Reuters S12 Ownership database. 
                                                                                                                 (8) 
where j indexes mutual funds and t indexes quarters.         is the total flow experienced by fund j in 
quarter t, and        is fund j’s total assets at the end of previous quarter. Then, I construct the 
following mutual fund outflow measure for each stock-quarter observation: 
                                
                 
      
 
      
                                
               
 
                    (9) 
where i indexes stocks; t indexes quarters;                                           is the dollar 
value of fund j’s position in stock i, as a percentage of its portfolio at the end of the previous quarter; 
       is the total dollar trading volume of stock i in quarter t. Following Edmans, Goldstein, and 
Jiang (2012), the summation is only computed for over funds with more than 5% outflow, namely 
                .
23 I add a negative sign to this measure to ease with interpretation. That is, 
higher values of               mean the stock is owned more by open-end mutual funds that 
experienced large capital outflows. 
The measure           captures the price pressure on stocks that is induced by investor 
outflow of mutual funds. I include both MF_Outflow and Shrpct_CEF_ARS in a modified version of 
model (6). Table VIII presents the results. First, the coefficients on MF_Outflow are positive for 
columns (1) and (2) (0.07 with t-stat. of 1.26 for  Log(Rspread) and 0.34 with t-stat. of 3.46 for 
 Log(Amihud)) and negative in column (3) (-0.30 with t-stat. of -2.84). Thus, large investor outflow 
induces lower stock returns and drop in market liquidity. More importantly, Shrpct_CEF_ARS still 
have similar coefficients, both in terms of magnitude and significance, to the ones reported in Table 
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 My results are not sensitive to this restriction imposed.  Similar results are obtained if I sum it over the mutual 
fund with top 10 percentile of outflows.  
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III. This set of results suggests that the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze can not be 
explained by concurrent forces like investor outflows of open-end mutual funds. 
[Insert Table VIII here] 
 
F. Spillover Effects and Selling by ARS-Levered CEFs 
In this section, I analyze the selling behavior of CEFs and further test whether the spillover 
effects documented above are indeed associated with the selling by ARS-levered CEFs. 
First, I examine the selling behavior of CEFs before and after the ARS market freeze. I 
compare the net sales as a percentage of the portfolio dollar value for ARS-levered and other CEFs. 
Panel A of Table IX presents the results. I find that, on average, ARS-levered CEFs sell about 8.1% 
of their portfolio value each quarter in 2008, while other CEFs do not exhibit similar selling 
behaviors during this time period. The difference between the two groups is 11.7% with a p-value of 
0.028. In addition, in the years before or after 2008, neither ARS-levered CEFs nor non-ARS-levered 
CEFs exhibit these selling behaviors. These results confirm that there is indeed intense selling 
behavior by ARS-levered CEFs after the ARS market freeze in 2008. 
[Insert Table IX here] 
Next, I examine whether the spillover effects are associated with the selling behavior of ARS-
levered CEFs. To do this, I include a dummy variable,  Shrpt_CEF_ARS<0, which is equal to 1 if 
ARS-levered CEFs reduce their position in a quarter, in Equation (6) regressions.24 To help reduce 
concerns about reverse causality, I use the ownership of ARS-levered CEFs at the end of previous 
quarter, rather than the current actual holding position change, as the main independent variable. 
Panel B of Table IX presents the results. The coefficients on  Shrpt_CEF_ARS<0 are positive in the 
first two columns (0.08 with t-stat. of 14.65  Log(Rspread) and 0.10 with t-stat. 9.34 for 
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 Log(Amuhid)) and negative for daily returns (-0.06 with t-stat. of -6.44). This set of results confirms 
that the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze are driven by the selling behavior of ARS-levered 
CEFs. 
 
G. Portfolio Decisions of ARS-Levered CEFs after the ARS Market Freeze 
We have documented that there is intense selling by ARS-levered CEFs in the previous 
sections. In this section, I examine how ARS-levered CEFs adjust their portfolios after experiencing 
a sharp increase in their borrowing costs due to the ARS market freeze. Specifically, I investigate 
whether ARS-levered CEFs “strategically” avoid selling illiquid stock positions in their portfolios to 
minimize the associated price pressure. 
To do this, I first compare the characteristics of stock positions that are sold by ARS-levered 
CEFs after the ARS market freeze to other positions in their portfolios. Panel A of Table X reports the 
univariate comparison results. The analyses are carried out at fund-quarter-stock level. The results in 
Panel A show that there are significant differences between the two groups in market liquidity, 
market capitalization, Shrpct_CEF_ARS, liquidity beta, and idiosyncratic volatility. It suggests that, 
after the ARS market freeze, ARS-levered CEFs tend to sell positions that are liquid, with larger 
market cap, with lower liquidity beta, and with higher idiosyncratic volatility, which can help 
minimize the price impact associated with trading. Also, they tend to sell larger positions in their 
portfolio to raise capital after the ARS market freeze. 
 [Insert Table X here] 
Next, I employ a Logit model approach to carry out the multivariate analyses. The dependant 
variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a stock position is sold after the ARS market freeze and 
0 otherwise. I regress the dummy variable on various lagged characteristics of the stock positions, 
including liquidity, size, Shrpct_CEF_ARS, idiosyncratic volatility, B/M ratio, momentum, Market 
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Beta, and Liquidity Beta. I also include time and industry dummies in the regressions. Panel B of 
Table X reports the estimation results. Similar to the univariate results, the multivariate results 
confirm that large positions in the portfolio that are liquid, with large capitalization, with higher 
idiosyncratic volatility, and with lower liquidity beta are more likely to be sold by ARS-levered CEFs 
after the ARS market freeze. 
The above empirical evidence suggests that ARS-levered CEFs tend to avoid selling illiquid 
and small stocks in their portfolios to minimize the associated price pressure. Nevertheless, this 
strategic behavior is not likely to fully remove the negative impact of the ARS market freeze on 
ARS-levered CEFs, which borrow on average 23% of their total assets from the ARS market and also 
have concentrated portfolio holdings. It will only work against one to find any spillover effects on the 
stocks sold by ARS-levered CEFs. 
 
H. Additional Tests 
I conduct several additional tests for robustness purposes. First, I use propensity score 
matching to construct a control sample. Specifically, for the stocks held by any CEF, I first model the 
likelihood the stock is held by an ARS-levered CEF. The independent variables used in the Logit 
model include lagged liquidity, market cap, momentum, B/M ratio, quarter dummies, and industry 
dummies. I generate a one-to-one matched sample based on the predicted likelihood that a stock is 
held by an ARS-levered CEF. I re-estimate the main specification as in Equation (6) on this matched 
sample. As shown in Table XI, the results are similar to the results reported in Table III. Thus, my 
results are robust to alternative ways of constructing the control group. 
[Insert Table XI here] 
Second, my results are robust to the use of percentage changes in market liquidity instead of 
the absolute value of the changes as the dependent variable. As shown in columns (1) and (2) of 
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Table XII, the results are similar to those in Table III; in columns (3) and (4), I find similar results as 
in Table VI. Thus, my results are robust to the way I measure the stocks’ liquidity changes. 
[Insert Table XII here] 
Third, there are some international equity closed-end funds that also have a certain portion of 
their assets invested in the U.S. domestic equity market. There are 52 international equity closed-end 
funds with some U.S. common stocks in their portfolios during the year of 2008. Though I do not 
have the complete portfolio holdings of these international equity CEFs, my results are robust if I 
include international equity closed-end funds in my sample. Results are tabulated in Table A.I in the 
Appendix. 
Last, I also examine the determinants of leverage of the U.S. closed-end funds industry over 
the period from 1994 to 2009. Specifically, I estimate a pooled OLS regression of the total leverage 
of 677 closed-end funds in U.S. with all objectives (i.e., domestic equity, municipal bond, taxable 
bond, international equity, and others CEFs) on lagged macro-economic variables and fund 
characteristics. Results are reported in Table A.II in the Appendix. Consistent with theory (e.g., 
Acharya and Viswanathan (2011), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Geanakoplos (2010)), the results 
show that the closed-end fund industry tends to borrow more during good times, proxied by higher 
term spread, low VIX index, and higher dividend yields of the overall stock market. 25 These findings 
are consistent with the evidence of Adrian and Shin (2010), who find that the leverage ratio of the 
main investment banks in U.S. is high during boom times and low during bust times. 
 
 
                                                        
25
 The term spread is calculated as the difference in the returns of long term treasury bonds and three-month treasury 
bills; VIX index is the option-implied measure of volatility from Chicago Board Options Exchanges; CRSP dividend 
yields of the overall stock market are calculated as the difference between CRSP value-weighted stock returns with 
and without dividends. 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
Using the ARS market freeze in February 2008 as an exogenous funding shock, I find 
systematic empirical evidence of the spillover effects of the shock on stocks held by ARS-levered 
CEFs. I find that the stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs experience larger declines in market liquidity 
and lower daily returns after the ARS market freeze than other stocks. The spillover effects on stock 
returns are temporary and disappear within the next twelve months. Further investigation shows that 
ARS-levered CEFs liquidated a large portion of their portfolios after experiencing the ARS market 
shock, which causes the temporary spillover effects. 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing new empirical evidence on the 
transmission of funding liquidity shocks to the underlying asset markets (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009), Acharya and Viswanathan (2011)). It also helps our understanding of the fire-sale externality 
associated with leverage in the financial sector on financial markets (e.g., Stein (2009)). Moreover, 
this study has policy implications on the leverage regulation of financial intermediaries, such as 
investment companies. During the crisis period, unconditionally constant legal limits on assets 
coverage ratio or capital requirement ratio are more likely to bind financial firms, which can force 
them to deleverage and liquidate assets to stay in line with the legal requirements. My evidence 
supports the idea that the regulators should manage system wide leverage along with market cycles, 
that is to curtail leverage in good times and to prop up leverage in bad times (Geanakoplos (2010), 
Wang (2010)). 
Lastly, many ARS-levered CEFs specialize in asset markets such as municipal bond markets, 
corporate bond markets, and international equity markets. To the extent that these asset markets are 
less liquid than the U.S. equity market, my study provides a lower bound of the spillover effects of 
the ARS market freeze to the underlying asset markets. One would expect spillover effects of the 
ARS market freeze in 2008 to be larger for CEFs specialized in these less liquid assets. Moreover, 
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future research may also examine the relation between closed-end fund discounts and the level of 
ARS borrowing before and after the ARS market freeze. The deterioration of debt market liquidity 
may lead to the firm to default even when the firm’s fundamentals are still high (He and Xiong 
(2011)). Thus, it would be interesting to examine the exit of CEFs after the ARS market shock such 
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Time Series of Borrowing of Auction Rate Securities by Closed-End Funds 
 
This figure reports the aggregated borrowing from the auction rate security market and other sources such as 
bank loans of the closed-end funds during the period from 2007Q1 to 2009Q2. I aggregate the borrowing in 






























Ownership of ARS-levered Closed-End Funds and Percentage Change in Liquidity 
 
This figure reports % change in liquidity of the stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs after the ARS market freeze 
in February 2008. I divide the sample of stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs into three groups based on the 
aggregated ownership: (0%, 1%], (1%, 3%], (3%, 15%). The median % change in liquidity of each group over 
the previous quarter is reported for two liquidity measures, Amihud Ratio and Rspread. Amihud ratio is the 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, defined as quarterly average of the ratio of absolute value of daily return 
over daily dollar volume. Rspread is the relative bid-ask spread in percentage points, defined as the difference 
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 Effects of Auction Rate Security Market Freeze on Stock Returns 
 
This figure plots the monthly coefficients of ownership by ARS-levered CEFs (Shrpct_CEF_ARS) with the 
cumulative stock returns as the dependent variable as in Table V. All the controls in Equation (6) are included 
in the regressions, including time and industry dummies. t0 is the quarter-end month that ARS-levered CEFs 
hold stock positions prior the ARS market freeze. The coefficients plotted are backward-looking two-month 






















Summary Statistics of Closed-End Fund Characteristics 
 
Panel A of this table reports the summary statistics of the variables of closed-end funds (CEFs) in my sample 
from 2006-2009. Leverage_total is the total leverage of a closed-end fund, calculated as (Total assets – Total 
NAV)/ Total Assets; Leverage_ARS is the level of borrowing from the auction rate security (ARS) market, 
measured as (Total auction rate preferred stocks / Total assets); Leverage_other is the borrowing from other 
sources such as bank loans, calculated as the difference between total leverage (Leverage_total) and leverage 
from the ASR market (Leverage_ARS). Total assets, Total auction rate preferred stocks, and Total NAV are 
obtained from balance sheet and income statement data on the N-SAR reports that CEFs file to SEC. Market 
Capitalization is the product of stock price of the CEF and shares outstanding. Panel B of this table compares 
the fund characteristics and holding characteristics in the four quarters of 2008 of ARS-levered CEFs versus 
other CEFs. The holding information is from s12 data of Thomson Reuters Ownership Database. N is the 
number of fund-quarter observations. PortHHI is the Herfindahl index of the portfolio, calculated from the 




Panel A.  Closed-End Fund Characteristics  





Total Assets 557.3 298.7 664.0 11.6 3478.4 1,524 
Market Capitalization 411.9 241.5 466.3 8.5 2375.7 1,507 
Leverage_total  19.7% 20.7% 16.3% 0.1% 51.5% 1,524 
Leverage_ARS 9.8% 0.0% 13.9% 0.0% 43.5% 1,524 






Panel B.  Comparison of ARS-Levered CEFs and Non-ARS-Levered CEFs 
  ARS-Levered CEFs   Non-ARS-Levered CEFs 
Diff. in 
Mean t-stat.   N Mean Median Std.   N Mean Median Std. 
Fund Characteristics          
Total Assets 104 673.1 462.3 635.6  177 368.1 266.7 377.6 305.0*** 5.05 
Market Cap. 104 995.9 750.6 904.1  177 419.0 265.8 425.2 576.9*** 7.24 
Leverage_total 104 34.9% 36.7% 12.2%  177 9.6% 3.7% 12.2% 25.3%*** 16.79 
Leverage_ARS 104 23.1% 25.2% 12.1%  177 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 23.1%*** 19.38 
Leverage_other 104 11.8% 8.8% 12.3%  177 9.6% 3.7% 12.2% 2.2% 1.46 
            
Portfolio Holdings          
# of Stocks 104 62 27 109  177 137 49 275 -75*** -3.23 
Size ($ Billions) 104 35.0 18.6 39.1  177 59.4 57.5 39.8 -24.3*** -5.00 
HHI 104 0.30 0.06 0.35  177 0.08 0.027 0.19 0.22*** 6.01 
Rspread (%) 104 0.154 0.130 0.088  177 0.140 0.099 0.187 0.014 0.86 
Amihud Ratio 104 0.022 0.001 0.081  177 0.065 0.0001 0.475 -0.043 -1.18 
Market Beta 101 0.77 0.75 0.31  177 0.97 0.93 0.26 -0.20*** -5.42 




Stock Characteristics and Holdings of Closed-End Funds 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of stock characteristics in the four quarters of 2008. Log(Amihud) is 
the log of Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, defined as quarterly average of the ratio of absolute value of 
daily return over daily dollar volume. Log(Rspread) is the log of relative bid-ask spread in percentage points, 
defined as the difference between ask and bid prices over the midpoint. ∆Log(Amihud) and ∆Log(Rspread) are 
the changes in the log of Amihud ratio and Rspread measure over previous quarter. Daily Return is the 
quarterly average of daily return of a stock. Log(Size) is the log of quarter-end market capitalization of a stock 
in millions of dollars. Market Beta and Liquidity Beta for a stock at a given month are obtained from a 
regression of monthly stock returns on value-weighted CRSP stock returns and liquidity innovation factor of 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) in the previous five years. Shrpct_CEF is the aggregated ownership from S12 data 
of Thomson Reuters by all CEFs in my sample, as a percentage of shares outstanding of a stock; Shrpct_CEF_ARS 
is the ownership of a stock by CEFs that borrow from the ARS market, referred as ARS-levered CEFs. 
Leverage_total and Leverage_ARS are the weighted-average total leverage and leverage from the ARS market of 
closed-end funds that held a specific stock using the number of shares as the weight:             
        
 
                                                   
 
    where i indexes stocks; j indexes 
closed-end funds; and t indexes quarters. Panel B of this table presents the distribution of aggregate ownership 
as percentage of shares outstanding by CEFs at the fourth quarter of 2007, before the ARS market freeze.  
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics of Stock Characteristics 
Variables Mean Median Std. Min Max N 
 
Stock Characteristics      
Log (Amihud) -19.52 -19.62 2.55 -26.72 -9.93 11,220 
Log (Rspread) -6.19 -6.38 0.98 -8.84 -1.37 11,221 
  Log (Amihud) 0.36 0.27 0.70 -3.88 3.94 11,213 
  Log (Rspread) 0.16 0.10 0.38 -3.85 2.52 11,218 
Daily Return -0.11% -0.06% 0.58% -13.52% 6.56% 11,220 
Log(Size) 6.78 6.53 1.64 1.60 10.89 11,134 
Market Beta  1.29 1.18 0.74 -1.52 6.95 10,157 
Liquid Beta 0.01 0.002 0.27 -2.68 1.39 10,157 
       
Holdings Related Variables      
Shrpct_CEF 0.29% 0.05% 0.77% 0.000002% 14.55% 11,225 
Shrpct_CEF_ARS 0.17% 0.00% 0.64% 0.00% 14.55% 11,225 
Leverage_total 11.4% 12.8% 9.2% 0.0% 48.8% 11,225 





Panel B. Distribution of Ownership by Domestic Equity CEFs at the end of 2007Q4 
Ownership Range No. of stocks Percentage 
No. of stocks held by CEFs                  2,880  61.4% 
      No. of stocks with less than 0.5% held by CEFs                  2,407  51.3% 
      No. of stocks with 0.5% to 1% held by CEFs                     228  4.9% 
      No. of stocks with 1% to 3% held by CEFs                     194  4.1% 
      No. of stocks with 3% to 15% held by CEFs                       51  1.1% 
No. of stocks not held by CEFs                  1,810  38.6% 







Table III Spillover Effects of the Auction Rate Security (ARS) Market Freeze 
 
This table reports pooled OLS estimation results of equation (6) with the time and industry fixed effects over 
the four quarters of 2008. The dependent variables used are changes in the log of relative spread in column (1), 
changes in the log of Amihud ratio in column (2), and quarterly average daily returns in column (3). 
Shrpct_CEF_ARS are the ownership of a stock by ARS-levered CEFs in the previous quarter-end. Shrpct_Other is 
the aggregate ownership of a stock by institutional investors from S34 data of Thomson Reuters, excluding CEFs. 
Idio. Volatility is idiosyncratic volatility calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model of each quarter using daily stock return. Other variables are defined in Table II. Standard errors 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the stock level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  Log(Rspread)  Log(Amihud) Daily Return (%) 
        
Shrpct_CEF_ARS 3.39*** 5.07*** -2.73*** 
 (4.78) (4.34) (-4.07) 
Lagged Liquidity Level -0.10*** -0.22*** 0.13*** 
 (-13.64) (-26.29) (18.97) 
Log (Size) -0.04*** -0.33*** 0.19*** 
 (-12.30) (-27.29) (18.97) 
Market Beta 0.03*** 0.06*** -0.01 
 (6.55) (6.77) (-1.03) 
Liquid Beta 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.14*** 
 (4.81) (2.65) (6.28) 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.07*** 
 (-10.44) (-4.62) (6.26) 
Shrpct_Other -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (-0.07) (0.90) (0.65) 
Idio. Volatility 5.26*** 5.37*** -2.43*** 
 (21.37) (12.68) (-4.21) 
Constant -0.37*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 
 (-9.69) (2.87) (3.78) 
    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 10,134 10,133 10,133 




Table IV Contrafactual Tests over the Period of 2006-2007 
 
This table reports pooled OLS estimation results of equation (6) over the period of 2006-2007. The dependent 
variables used are changes in the log of relative spread in column (1), changes in the log of Amihud ratio in 
column (2), and quarterly average daily returns in column (3). Shrpct_CEF_ARS are the ownership of a stock by 
ARS-levered CEFs in the previous quarter-end. Other variables are defined in Table II. Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the stock level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
   
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  Log(Rspread)  Log(Amihud) Daily Return (%) 
        
Shrpct_CEF_ARS 0.50 1.50 0.29 
 (1.62) (1.31) (0.91) 
Lagged Liquidity Level -0.13*** -0.17*** 0.07*** 
 (-26.01) (-28.16) (21.32) 
Log (Size) -0.05*** -0.25*** 0.11*** 
 (-23.53) (-28.50) (22.86) 
Market Beta 0.01** -0.01*** -0.01 
 (2.07) (-2.70) (-1.33) 
Liquid Beta 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.09) (-1.50) (-0.98) 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.02*** -0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (-5.96) (-3.43) (4.59) 
Shrpct_Other -0.02*** -0.03*** 0.01 
 (-3.06) (-2.61) (0.94) 
Idio. Volatility 0.92*** 0.51 -0.24 
 (2.87) (0.81) (-0.40) 
Constant -0.18** 0.03 -0.06 
 (-1.97) (0.16) (-1.06) 
    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 15,424 15,407 15,407 





Table V Short-term vs. Long-term Effects of the ARS Market Freeze 
 
This table reports pooled OLS estimation results of equation (6) with cumulative stock returns as the 
dependent variables. The dependent variables in columns (1)-(4) are 3-month, 6-month, 9-month, and 12-
month cumulative stock returns respectively. Shrpct_CEF_ARS are the ownership of a stock by ARS-levered 
CEFs in the previous quarter-end. Other variables are defined in Table II. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the stock level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked 
with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 










          
Shrpct_CEF_ARS -1.48*** -1.01** -0.78 0.02 
 (-5.19) (-2.21) (-1.14) (0.03) 
Lagged Liquidity Level 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.01* 
 (17.96) (8.83) (3.50) (1.77) 
Log (Size) 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.02** 
 (17.12) (8.57) (3.25) (1.96) 
Market Beta -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04*** 
 (-3.80) (-5.90) (-7.24) (-4.55) 
Liquid Beta 0.04*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (4.31) (1.02) (0.39) (0.80) 
NASDAQ Dummy 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
 (4.92) (4.92) (4.67) (3.64) 
Shrpct_Other -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (-0.25) (0.16) (0.25) (0.56) 
Idio. Volatility -2.97*** -3.55*** -3.36*** -2.27*** 
 (-13.95) (-14.86) (-11.21) (-6.18) 
Constant 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.56*** 0.39*** 
 (10.41) (5.52) (11.73) (6.99) 
     
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 10,089 9,941 9,797 9,676 






Table VI Spillover Effects and Leverage from the ARS Market 
 
This table reports pooled OLS estimation results of equation (7) over the four quarters of 2008. The dependent 
variables used are changes in the log of relative spread in column (1), changes in the log of Amihud ratio in 
column (2), and quarterly average daily returns in column (3). Hold>Median is a dummy variable indicating 
that the level of holding by ARS-levered CEFs in quarter t-1 is above median level among all stocks with 
positive ownership by ARS-levered CEFs, Leverage_ARS is the weighted-average leverage from the ARS market 
of CEFs that hold a given stock, and the interaction term of the two are included in the regressions. Other variables 
are defined in Table II. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the stock level; t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  Log(Rspread)  Log(Amihud) Daily Return (%) 
        
Hold>Median 0.078*** 0.068*** -0.040* 
 (3.13) (4.91) (-1.78) 
Leverage_ARS × Hold>Median 0.337* 0.371*** -0.283* 
 (1.96) (3.76) (-1.67) 
Leverage_ARS 0.087 0.039 -0.092 
 (0.58) (0.45) (-0.64) 
Lagged Liquidity Level -0.219*** -0.104*** 0.133*** 
 (-27.39) (-14.67) (19.76) 
Log (Size) -0.331*** -0.044*** 0.194*** 
 (-28.31) (-13.00) (19.61) 
Market Beta 0.062*** 0.032*** -0.009 
 (6.78) (6.73) (-1.02) 
Liquid Beta 0.051** 0.049*** 0.140*** 
 (2.51) (4.64) (6.42) 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.047*** -0.056*** 0.066*** 
 (-4.22) (-9.55) (5.94) 
Shrpct_Other 0.008 -0.004 0.013 
 (0.59) (-0.57) (0.88) 
Idio. Volatility 5.368*** 5.278*** -2.424*** 
 (12.57) (21.29) (-4.19) 
Constant 0.193*** -0.366*** 0.250*** 
 (2.99) (-9.84) (3.65) 
    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 10,134 10,133 10,133 






Table VII Spillover Effects and Liquidity Level before the ARS Market Freeze 
 
This table reports pooled OLS estimation results of equations (6) over two subsamples divided based the 
median liquidity level in 2007. The dependent variables used are changes in the log of relative spread in 
column (1) and changes in the log of Amihud ratio in column (2). Illiquid (Liquid) Dummy is a dummy variable 
indicating that the market liquidly of a stock is below (above) median level among all the common stocks in 2007. 
Shrpct_CEF_ARS are the ownership of a stock by ARS-levered CEFs in the previous quarter-end. Other variables 
are defined in Table II. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the stock level; t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES  Log(Rspread)  Log(Amihud) 
      
Shrpct_CEF_ARS × Illiquid Dummy (a) 4.080*** 6.061*** 
 (3.89) (3.66) 
Shrpct_CEF_ARS × Liquid Dummy (b) 1.495*** 2.498*** 
 (2.92) (2.73) 
Illiquid Dummy 0.029*** 0.043*** 
 (3.92) (3.01) 
Lagged Liquidity Level -0.104*** -0.224*** 
 (-13.87) (-25.99) 
Log (Size) -0.037*** -0.326*** 
 (-9.97) (-27.09) 
Market Beta 0.033*** 0.063*** 
 (6.72) (6.75) 
Liquid Beta 0.056*** 0.060*** 
 (5.15) (2.85) 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.062*** -0.054*** 
 (-10.67) (-4.81) 
Shrpct_Other -0.006 0.005 
 (-0.80) (0.33) 
Idio. Volatility 5.348*** 5.449*** 
 (21.47) (12.82) 
Constant -0.497*** 0.055 
 (-9.72) (0.92) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 10,134 10,133 
R-squared 0.509 0.570 
   
Additional Tests:   
(a) – (b) 2.585** 3.563* 






Table VIII Spillover Effects and Outflows of Open-end Mutual Funds 
 
This table reports the estimation results of Equation (6) with a mutual fund outflow measure added in the 
regressions. The dependent variables used are changes in the log of relative spread in column (1), changes in 
the log of Amihud ratio in column (2), and quarterly average daily returns in column (3). Shrpct_CEF_ARS are 
the ownership of a stock by ARS-levered CEFs in the previous quarter-end. MF_Outflow is a mutual fund price 
pressure measure calculated as follows: 
                
                                 
               
 
   
 
It takes a higher value if the stock is held by more open-end mutual funds with more than 5% outflow of total assets. 
Other variables are defined in Table II. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
stock level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  Log(Rspread)  Log(Amihud) Daily Return (%) 
        
Shrpct_CEF_ARS 3.39*** 5.09*** -2.74*** 
 (4.78) (4.35) (-4.13) 
MF_Outflow 0.07 0.34*** -0.30*** 
 (1.26) (3.46) (-2.84) 
Lagged Liquidity Level -0.10*** -0.22*** 0.13*** 
 (-13.59) (-26.23) (18.88) 
Log (Size) -0.04*** -0.33*** 0.19*** 
 (-12.20) (-27.17) (18.78) 
Market Beta 0.03*** 0.06*** -0.01 
 (6.56) (6.80) (-1.05) 
Liquid Beta 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.14*** 
 (4.81) (2.65) (6.30) 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.07*** 
 (-10.37) (-4.50) (6.16) 
Shrpct_Other -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (-0.05) (0.95) (0.61) 
Idio. Volatility 5.26*** 5.38*** -2.45*** 
 (21.38) (12.73) (-4.23) 
Constant -0.37*** 0.16** 0.28*** 
 (-9.75) (2.55) (4.03) 
    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 10,134 10,133 10,133 




Table IX Ownership Changes of ARS-levered CEFs 
 
Panel A of this table analyze the selling behavior of CEFs during the period from 2006 to 2009. I compare the 
net sales as a percentage of portfolio dollar value for ARS-levered CEFs and other CEFs. Panel B reports the 
estimation results of Equation (6) with contemporaneous ownership changes of ARS-levered CEFs, rather than 
the ownership in the previous quarter. The dependent variables used are changes in the log of relative spread in 
column (1), changes in the log of Amihud ratio in column (2), and quarterly average daily returns in column 
(3). Shrpct_CEF_ARS are the ownership of a stock by ARS-levered CEFs.  Shrpct_CEF_ARS<0 is a dummy 
variable that equals to 1 if the change in Shrpct_CEF_ARS in the current quarter is negative. Other variables are 
defined in Table II. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the stock level; t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, 




Panel A. Net Sales as % of Portfolio Dollar Value by CEFs 
  
 
ARS-Levered CEFs   
 
Non-ARS-Levered CEFs       
Year N Mean Median Std Dev   N Mean Median Std Dev   Diff. p-value 
2006 143 -1.76 -1.52 15.15  145 -0.86 -1.95 37.75  -0.90 79.1% 
2007 146 -0.91 -1.37 27.35  171 0.32 -1.24 21.98  -1.23 66.3% 
2008 106 -8.11 -4.01 27.59  162 3.63 -1.35 58.53  -11.74** 2.8% 






Panel B. Multivariate Results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  Log(Rspread)  Log(Amihud) Daily Return (%) 
        
 Shrpct_CEF_ARS<0 0.08*** 0.10*** -0.06*** 
 (14.65) (9.34) (-6.44) 
Lagged Liquidity Level -0.11*** -0.22*** 0.13*** 
 (-15.08) (-27.40) (19.69) 
Log (Size) -0.05*** -0.34*** 0.20*** 
 (-14.72) (-28.62) (19.75) 
Market Beta 0.03*** 0.06*** -0.01 
 (6.74) (6.77) (-1.06) 
Liquid Beta 0.05*** 0.05** 0.14*** 
 (4.78) (2.55) (6.39) 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.07*** 
 (-9.83) (-4.35) (6.04) 
Shrpct_Other -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (-0.87) (0.41) (0.95) 
Idio. Volatility 5.21*** 5.25*** -2.36*** 
 (21.23) (12.36) (-4.09) 
Constant -0.32*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 
 (-8.80) (4.19) (3.17) 
    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 10,134 10,133 10,133 





Table X Portfolio Decisions of ARS-levered CEFs 
 
This table presents the results of the analyses on the portfolio decisions of ARS-levered CEFs after the ARS 
market freeze in February 2008. Panel A compares the lagged characteristics of the stock positions that are sold 
by ARS-levered CEFs after the ARS-market freeze to other positions in their portfolio. Panel B reports the 
results from the multivariate Logit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if 
a stock position is sold after the ARS market freeze and 0 otherwise. Adj. B/M Ratio is the Book-to-Market ratio 
of a stock, adjusted by the industry median level. Momentum is the three-month cumulative stock returns. The 
regressors are lagged by one quarter. Other variables are defined in Table II. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the stock level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked 
with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Univariate Results 
  
Sell Positions 
of ARS-Levered CEFs   
Other Positions 
of ARS-Levered CEFs     
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev   N Mean Median Std Dev Diff t-stat. 
Log(Rspread) 2,456 -6.76 -7.04 0.99  5,956 -6.68 -6.94 0.97 -0.08*** (-3.32) 
Log(Amihud) 2,452 -21.58 -22.22 2.93  5,947 -21.24 -21.73 2.86 -0.34*** (-4.87) 
Size ($M) 2,441 8.23 8.34 2.30  5,911 8.00 8.00 2.22 0.23*** (4.14) 
Market Beta 2,326 1.12 0.97 0.67  5,644 1.11 1.00 0.63 0.004 (0.23) 
Liquidity Beta 2,326 0.02 0.00 0.22  5,644 0.026 0.011 0.211 -0.010* (-1.85) 
Idio. Volatility 2,451 2.22% 1.85% 1.39%  5,946 2.09% 1.75% 1.20% 0.14%*** (4.30) 





Panel B. Multivariate Results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Sell Sell Sell 
        
Lagged Liquidity -0.122**  -0.155** 
 (-2.19)  (-1.97) 
Log (Size)  0.143** -0.042 
  (2.37) (-0.67) 
Market Beta -0.022 0.014 -0.056 
 (-0.44) (0.28) (-1.17) 
Liquid Beta -0.296** -0.268** -0.231* 
 (-2.17) (-2.01) (-1.90) 
Idio. Volatility 19.119*** 17.786*** 19.147*** 
 (6.08) (6.29) (6.92) 
Shrpct_CEF_ARS 15.553** 14.025** 16.737** 
 (2.20) (2.10) (2.32) 
Adj. B/M Ratio 0.023 0.017 0.021 
 (0.78) (0.58) (0.60) 
Momentum -0.001 -0.048 0.028 
 (-0.00) (-0.32) (0.20) 
NASDAQ Dummy 0.159* 0.136 0.176 
 (1.86) (1.48) (1.63) 
Constant -16.960*** -16.249 -5.161*** 
 (-11.18) (-3.50) (-2.73) 
    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 7,898 7,898 7,898 




Table XI Robustness: Propensity Score Matching Method 
 
Panel A of this table reports the univariate comparison of the stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs and the matched sample that is constructed using a 
propensity score matching method. I generate a one-to-one matching sample to the stocks held by ARS-levered CEFs based on the predicted propensity. 
The variables that used in the propensity score matching process include lagged liquidity, lagged market cap, lagged momentum, lagged B/M ratio, 
quarter dummies, and industry dummies. Panel B reports pooled OLS estimation results of Equation (6) with the Propensity Score Matched control 
sample. Variables are defined in Table II. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the stock level; t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Univariate Comparison   
 





Variable N Mean Median Std Dev   N Mean Median Std Dev t-stat. 
Shrpct_CEF_ARS 4,065 0.46% 0.15% 1.00% 
 
4,065 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.46%*** (16.35) 
Log(Rspread) 4,065 -6.43 -6.69 1.01 
 
4,065 -6.70 1.09 -7.95 -0.04 (-0.90) 
Log(Amihud) 4,065 -20.31 -20.59 2.81 
 
4,065 -20.76 2.83 -25.30 -0.10 (-0.74) 
Log(Size) 4,065 14.03 13.97 2.02 
 
4,065 13.99 1.91 9.61 0.06 (0.55) 
Momentum 4,065 -11.8% -11.8% 25.4% 
 
4,065 -11.0% 27.5% -73.7% -0.4% (-0.50) 




Panel B. Multivariate Results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  Log(Rspread)  Log(Amihud) Daily Return (%) 
        
Shrpct_CEF_ARS 2.44*** 4.57*** -2.24*** 
 
(4.35) (5.30) (-3.02) 
Lagged Liquidity Level -0.07*** -0.16*** 0.09*** 
 
(-8.39) (-17.08) (10.42) 
Log (Size) -0.03*** -0.23*** 0.11*** 
 
(-6.60) (-17.92) (9.46) 
Market Beta 0.01 0.03** 0.03*** 
 
(1.12) (2.14) (2.67) 
Liquid Beta 0.05*** 0.07** 0.09*** 
 
(3.20) (2.42) (2.95) 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.02*** -0.02 0.03* 
 
(-2.81) (-1.53) (1.91) 
Shrpct_Other -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
 
(-1.60) (-0.44) (0.39) 
Idio.  Volatility 5.02*** 6.06*** -3.51*** 
 
(13.99) (10.60) (-4.50) 
Constant -0.13* -0.23*** 0.44*** 
 
(-1.85) (-2.84) (4.53) 
    Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 7,584 7,584 7,584 









Table XII Robustness: Percentage Changes in Market Liquidity 
 
This table repeats the analyses in Table III and reports pooled OLS estimation results of Equation (6), except 
using different dependent variables. The dependent variables used are percentage changes in relative spread in 
column (1) and percentage changes in Amihud ratio in column (2). Shrpct_CEF_ARS are the ownership of a 
stock by ARS-levered CEFs in the previous quarter-end. Other variables are defined in Table II. Standard errors 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the stock level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 




 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
% change in 
Rspread 
% change in Amihud 
Ratio 
      
Shrpct_CEF_ARS 2.83*** 5.12** 
 (3.34) (2.21) 
Log (Size) 0.00 -0.09*** 
 (0.56) (-10.27) 
Market Beta 0.05*** 0.25*** 
 (6.80) (12.79) 
Liquid Beta 0.05*** 0.13*** 
 (3.05) (2.92) 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.09*** -0.10*** 
 (-11.75) (-4.22) 
Shrpct_Other 0.01 0.06** 
 (0.82) (2.24) 
Idio. Volatility 7.04*** 20.16*** 
 (19.64) (17.01) 
Constant -0.35*** 0.89** 
 (-7.67) (2.07) 
   
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Observations 10,134 10,133 







This Appendix tabulates two sets of additional results for some of the empirical tests that are 
mentioned in paper.  
 
A. Including International Equity Closed-End Funds 
There are 52 international equity closed-end funds with some U.S. common stocks in their 
portfolios. Table IA.I reports the analyses of the spillover effects of the ARS market freeze by 
considering both domestic and international equity CEFs. Panel A of this table repeats the analyses in 
Table III; Panel B repeats the analyses in Table V; and Panel C repeats the analyses in Table XII. 
 
B. Determinants of Closed-End Fund Leverage  
In Table A.II, I examine the determinants of leverage of the U.S. closed-end funds industry 
over the period from 1994 to 2009. Specifically, I estimate a pooled OLS regression of the total 
leverage of 677 closed-end funds in U.S. with different fund objectives (i.e., domestic equity, 
municipal bond, taxable bond, international equity, and others CEFs) on lagged macro-economic 
variables and fund characteristics. Panel A reports the summary statistics of the characteristics of U.S. 
closed-end funds over the period from 1994 to 2009; Panel B reports the summary statistics of macro 
variables; Panel C reports the correlation matrix; Panel D reports the estimation results of the 







Table A.I Spillover Effects of ARS Market Freeze: All Equity CEFs 
 
Panel A of this table repeats the analyses in Table III; Panel B repeats the analyses in Table V; and Panel C 
repeats the analyses in Table XII, by considering both domestic and international equity CEFs. 
Shrpct_CEF_ARS is the ownership of a stock by ARS-levered domestic and international equity CEFs in the 
previous quarter-end. Other variables are defined in Table II. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the stock level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked 
with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Spillover Effects of ARS Market Freeze: All Equity CEFs 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  Log(Rspread)  Log(Amihud) Daily Return (%) 
        
Shrpct_CEF_ARS 3.09*** 4.40*** -2.39*** 
 (4.42) (4.17) (-3.85) 
Lagged Liquidity Level -0.10*** -0.22*** 0.13*** 
 (-13.62) (-26.32) (18.96) 
Log (Size) -0.04*** -0.33*** 0.19*** 
 (-12.29) (-27.32) (18.96) 
Market Beta 0.03*** 0.06*** -0.01 
 (6.54) (6.74) (-1.02) 
Liquid Beta 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.14*** 
 (4.80) (2.65) (6.28) 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.07*** 
 (-10.45) (-4.63) (6.27) 
Shrpct_Other -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (-0.08) (0.89) (0.66) 
Idio. Volatility 5.26*** 5.37*** -2.44*** 
 (21.32) (12.65) (-4.21) 
Constant -0.37*** 0.19*** 0.26*** 
 (-9.65) (2.95) (3.73) 
    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 10,134 10,133 10,133 






Panel B. Short- vs. Long-term Effects of the ARS Market Freeze: All Equity CEFs 
 










          
Shrpct_CEF_ARS -1.28*** -0.88** -0.67 0.09 
 (-4.74) (-1.99) (-1.03) (0.10) 
Lagged Liquidity Level 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.01* 
 (17.93) (8.80) (3.48) (1.76) 
Log (Size) 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.02** 
 (17.10) (8.56) (3.24) (1.96) 
Market Beta -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04*** 
 (-3.78) (-5.90) (-7.24) (-4.54) 
Liquid Beta 0.04*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (4.32) (1.02) (0.39) (0.80) 
NASDAQ Dummy 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
 (4.93) (4.92) (4.67) (3.65) 
Shrpct_Other -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (-0.25) (0.16) (0.25) (0.56) 
Idio. Volatility -2.97*** -3.56*** -3.36*** -2.27*** 
 (-13.95) (-14.86) (-11.22) (-6.18) 
Constant 0.30*** 0.22*** 0.56*** 0.39*** 
 (10.35) (5.50) (11.70) (6.96) 
     
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 10,089 9,941 9,797 9,676 





Panel C. Percentage Changes in Market Liquidity: All Equity CEFs 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
% change in 
Rspread 
% change in Amihud 
Ratio 
      
Shrpct_CEF_ARS 2.61*** 4.36** 
 (3.10) (2.04) 
Log (Size) 0.00 -0.09*** 
 (0.54) (-10.31) 
Market Beta 0.05*** 0.25*** 
 (6.80) (12.77) 
Liquid Beta 0.05*** 0.13*** 
 (3.05) (2.91) 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.09*** -0.10*** 
 (-11.76) (-4.23) 
Shrpct_Other 0.01 0.06** 
 (0.81) (2.23) 
Idio. Volatility 7.04*** 20.16*** 
 (19.61) (17.01) 
Constant -0.35*** 0.90** 
 (-7.66) (2.08) 
   
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Observations 10,134 10,133 
R-squared 0.309 0.544 
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Table A.II Determinants of Closed-End Fund Leverage  
 
Panel A of this table reports the summary statistics of the characteristics of U.S. closed-end funds over the period from 1994 to 2009. Dividend Yield is 
the difference of the quarterly cumulative fund stock returns with and without dividends. Age is the number of years since a CEF first appears in CRSP. 
Fund Return is the quarterly cumulative CEF stock returns. Top Family is the indicator of the CEFs which belong to the top five CEFs families, 
BlackRock, Nuveen, Invesco Van Kampen, Eaton Vance, and Western Asset. Expense Ratio is defined as Selling, General & Administrative Expense 
(SG&A) over Total Common Equity. Other variables are defined in Table II. Panel B reports the summary statistics of macro variables. Term Spread is 
the quarterly average of the difference between the rates of US treasures with 20 year and 3month horizons. VIX is the quarterly average of the VIX index 
from Chicago Board Option Exchange. VWRETD is the quarterly cumulated value-weighted CRSP stock index return. CRSP Dividend Yield is the 
difference of the quarterly cumulative value weighted CRSP index returns with and without dividends. Panel C reports the correlation matrix. Panel D 
reports the estimation results of the determinants of the leverage ratio of U.S. closed-end funds over the period from 1994 to 2009. Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the fund level; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are 



























Full Sample (N=677) 
          Mean 266.2  399.9  9.8 23.4% 16.6% 6.8% 0.34% 0.50 1.70% 1.9% 
Median 161.0  225.6  8.6 31.0% 15.4% 1.7% 0.31% 1 1.60% 2.1% 
Std. 316.8  1,724.1  6.6 16.1% 16.7% 10.4% 0.15% 0.50 0.92% 9.4% 
1% Percentile 15.3  21.9  0.7 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.09% 0 0.00% -27.8% 
99% Percentile 1,756.0  2,442.1  33.3 50.4% 41.6% 44.0% 1.09% 1 5.45% 33.0% 
           Divided by Fund Objectives 
       Domestic Equity (N=109) 
       Mean 392.2  510.3  10.0 17.8% 10.0% 7.6% 0.40% 0.11 1.91% 1.8% 
Median 178.2  238.1  7.9 14.5% 0.0% 2.0% 0.33% 0 2.00% 2.1% 
International Equity (N=87) 
       Mean 241.6  299.5  10.4 7.2% 2.4% 4.8% 0.47% 0.05 0.93% 2.6% 
Median 141.1  174.4  10.3 1.7% 0.0% 1.4% 0.45% 0 0.00% 2.6% 
Municipal Bond (N=295) 
       Mean 213.3  367.8  8.6 29.9% 27.4% 2.6% 0.30% 0.82 1.50% 1.7% 
Median 144.9  219.8  7.8 34.8% 32.9% 0.8% 0.30% 1 1.50% 1.9% 
Taxable Bond (N=139) 
       Mean 294.3  430.5  11.9 22.4% 6.6% 15.7% 0.30% 0.33 2.29% 1.7% 
Median 197.8  253.9  9.6 26.2% 0.0% 13.5% 0.28% 0 2.17% 2.2% 
Others (N=47) 
       Mean 373.5  512.5  10.3 18.2% 4.7% 13.5% 0.36% 0.25 2.27% 2.2% 





Panel B. Summary Statistics of Macro variables  
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Term Spread 64 2.02% 1.77% 1.38% -0.31% 4.26% 
VIX 64 20.8 20.3 8.4 11.0 58.6 
VWRETD 64 2.26% 2.56% 9.19% -23.82% 21.29% 
































Leverage-total  1 
            
              Leverage -ARS 0.79 1 
           
 
0.0% 
            Leverage- other 0.27 -0.37 1 
          
 
0.0% 0.0% 
           Expense Ratio -0.32 -0.32 0.01 1 
         
 
0.0% 0.0% 14.6% 
          Dividend Yield 0.13 -0.06 0.28 -0.14 1 
        
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
         Market Cap. -0.02 -0.06 0.07 -0.14 0.10 1 
       
 
0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
        Total Assets 0.02 0.004 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.25 1 
      
 
0.0% 47.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
       Age -0.24 -0.21 -0.03 0.07 -0.08 0.02 0.001 1 
     
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 88.8% 
      Fund Return -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 
    
 
0.0% 0.0% 17.9% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 36.8% 31.1% 
     Term Spread 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.09 1 
   
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 14.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
    VIX Index 0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.07 0.13 -0.08 -0.03 0.10 0.17 0.38 1 
  
 
23.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
   CRSP Div. Yield 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.15 0.27 0.01 1 
 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 27.4% 73.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 
  CRSP VWRET -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 0.03 0.004 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.41 0.27 1 




Panel D. Determinants of CEF Leverage Usage 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Leverage_total Leverage_total Leverage_total 
        
Fund Characteristics 
   Log (Market Cap.) -0.017*** -0.002 -0.001 
 
(-3.524) (-0.397) (-0.287) 
Log(Age) -0.033*** -0.039*** -0.027*** 
 
(-6.293) (-8.356) (-6.130) 
Expense Ratio -32.976*** -2.040 -7.346 
 
(-7.254) (-0.452) (-1.566) 
Top Fund Family 0.060*** -0.004 0.006 
 
(5.413) (-0.336) (0.509) 
Dividend (Lagged) 1.827*** 1.875*** 1.817*** 
 
(4.653) (4.807) (5.158) 
Cumulative Ret. -0.088*** -0.032*** -0.097*** 
 
(-7.951) (-2.806) (-9.550) 
Fund Objectives 





















   Term Spread (Lagged) 
  
0.562*** 





   
(-3.655) 
Dividend Yield (Lagged) 
  
10.073*** 
   
(6.992) 
CRSP VW Ret. (Lagged) 
  
-0.139*** 
   
(-12.603) 
Constant 0.153*** -0.205*** 0.139*** 
 
(5.051) (-5.394) (3.546) 
    Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes No 
Cluster at Fund Level Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,063 27,063 27,051 
R-squared 0.251 0.347 0.276 
    Additional Tests 
   Taxable Bond-Domestic Equity 
 
0.059*** 0.040** 
Municipal Bond-Domestic Equity 
 
0.142*** 0.118*** 
Municipal Bond-Taxable Bond   0.083*** 0.078*** 
 
